Introduction
In our first paper 3 we proposed a dynamic theory relating alliances and acquisitions to the evolution of a technology and the market it serves. Industry structure and critical success factors change as the underlying technology evolves from phase to phase, competitive pressures exerted on a firm vary, and companies respond by adopting changing approaches to inter-firm collaboration. During the fluid phase new technology companies often form marketing alliances with established technology firms and pursue an aggressive licensing strategy to gain market recognition. The proliferation of technology startups provides an opportunity for established technology companies to obtain new technologies or enter niche markets through acquisitions or minority equity investments. Anticipating the emergence of a dominant design, companies can form standards alliances to promote their own proprietary technologies. During the transitional phase, companies with dominant designs gain recognition from the stock market, and soaring stock prices make it possible for them to acquire some of their competitors.
During the mature phase, technology is well defined and competition becomes intense.
Companies can form technology alliances to cut R&D costs. If a particular technology cannot be developed in-house, companies can acquire it on the open market. Marketing alliances frequently help companies target latent markets and expand into new geographic markets. During the phase of technological discontinuities the market is invaded by new technologies. Incumbents can utilize their resources to acquire the technologies needed for the newly defined marketplace. Attackers can gain market recognition through forming strategic supply alliances with established technology companies, which for the attackers is akin to the fluid phase behavior described above. In that first paper we illustrated these phenomena with a detailed case study of Microsoft, the world's leading software firm, from its origins until 2000. 
Compaq Computer

Fluid Phase (1982-1986)
Established in 1982 Compaq Computer got its name from a combination of two words: compatibility and quality. The company aimed at manufacturing high-quality IBM PC-compatibles. Unlike Microsoft Compaq entered the personal computer market without a revolutionary technology. 4 But from the very beginning the company was first to market with new technologies developed by the leading players of the industry. Thus, in a sense, its "technology" was being "first in with high quality" for PCs. 
Mature Phase (1991-1995)
The competition against Compaq intensified in 1990 as the clone makers began to offer the same technical quality and innovation for which Compaq had been known and they offered a much lower price to the customers. During this mature stage (Utterback 7 refers to it as the "specific stage") customers were most concerned with price and availability as quality and functionality of the PC brands converged. 
Discontinuities Phase (1996-2000)
Compaq Computer's growth rate slowed down during the second half of the 1990s. The global PC market was deep into its maturity phase and competition was stronger than ever. Several key competitors established themselves as the industry innovators by introducing new business models rather than new technologies. Dell
Computer, for example, was extremely successful with its direct sales strategy. Gateway became the only major PC manufacturer that had a company-owned retail network, 
Cisco Systems
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Cisco Systems is the leading networking hardware company in the world. Its family of products allows data to be accessed by computers on the network, even across different operating systems. Founded in 1984 Cisco's first product was a router that translated e-mails from computers with different operating systems. In its early years Cisco enjoyed rapid sales growth as its technologies served a niche market. Strictly a router company, it sold 5,000 routers for a total revenue of $70 millions in 1990.
During this phase competition was very low for Cisco. One priority was to gain market recognition. Cisco made a number of marketing alliances and supply agreements.
However, it was not very active in alliances activities at this stage nor did it make any acquisitions during these early years. Cisco was able to grow rapidly without the help of alliances and acquisitions. The main reason for its early success is that its router technology was a pioneering product and there was little competition.
Mature Phase (1991-1996)
As the PC market started to take shape, the networking market began its rapid expansion in 1991. Like Microsoft Cisco had the right technologies at the right time and it took full advantage of the market expansion. From 1991 to 1996 Cisco sales grew by an average rate of 100% on a yearly basis. In 1996 the company sold 824,000 routers and net sales reached a record of $4.1 billion, a 5,750% increase from 1990.
During this phase competition began to rise and Cisco's main competitor was Wellfleet Communications. New alternative networking technologies such as Ethernet and ATM switching products were developed by niche startups. Their presence threatened to take away some of the router market from Cisco. Cisco actively participated in alliances and acquis itions to ensure its technological and market leadership. From 1991 to 1996 Cisco participated in 27 joint ventures and alliances. Of these partnerships 47% included joint marketing arrangements, 27% had licensing agreements and 40% included joint research and development agreements. As expected from the theory most of Cisco's alliances during this phase aimed at marketing its products and developing new technologies. The majority of its marketing partners were established computer manufacturers including Apple, Compaq, DEC, IBM, NEC and Siemens.
In addition to alliances Cisco made minority equity investments in 12 technology startups. Most of these investments were part of comprehensive strategic alliance agreements. Forty-percent of the alliances included investments by Cisco, signaling that many of Cisco's partners were technology startups. Equity investments and alliances can and did lead to future acquisitions. For example, in February 1995 Cisco formed a broad strategic alliance with NETSYS Technologies, and made a minority investment in the company. Twenty months later it acquired the whole company for its network infrastructure management and performance analysis software. 16 Besides acquisitions Cisco has formed formal strategic alliances with prominent technology companies including EDS, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Motorola and Microsoft.
Minority Equity Investments
Between 1997 and 2000 it participated in 71 joint ventures and alliances. The number of joint venture agreements it signed increased steadily over those four years. Of these partnerships 55% of them included joint marketing arrangements, 15% involved minority equity investments and 35% of them had joint research and development agreements. As the competition intensified, marketing alliances became more important as Cisco attempted to provide complete end-to-end hardware and software solutions to its customers. During this stage many of the strategic relationships were long-term and consisted of multiple initiatives. 
R&D Marketing Licensing Equity Investments 17 Standards Total
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we studied the collaborative activities of two high-tech companies with respect to the technology life cycle. Each company operates in a distinct market sector in the computer industry: Microsoft, examined in our previous paper, is software, Compaq is hardware, and Cisco is networking. Despite the differences in their businesses, the three case studies are generally but not wholly supportive of the technology life cycle model, and demonstrate that decisions to ally or acquire by hightech companies relate to the evolution of the technology and the market structure.
In the fluid phase companies tend to focus on improving product functionality and Contrary to the model's expectations all three companies were more active in alliances and in mergers and acquisitions during this discontinuities phase than during the mature phase. The companies in the three case studies were all leaders in their respective technology sectors. They tend to have strong financial resources. In a period of technological discontinuities they are willing to invest to defend against attackers while entering into the new growth market. All three participated in a high number of joint R&D and marketing alliances as predicted by the model. The pattern of acquisitions and equity investments is very similar to the model's prediction as well.
In many aspects the case studies were supportive of the technology life cycle model. In particular, the firms' behaviors in the mature and discontinuities phases corresponded well to the theory. For the most part the companies in the case studies seemed to lack collaborative activities in the early stages of technology. Yet we need to take into consideration that these initial stages of industry-technology emergence took place 20 years ago. The technology life cycle model seems somewhat biased toward more current events. The correspondence of theory and case ought to be best when the firm is closest to being a single technology homogeneous entity. The early stages of Microsoft and Cisco are good proxies for single technology firms, and yet Cisco shows none of the expected collaborative acts during its fluid and transitional periods. As the firm grows larger and more successful, its tendency toward broadening its technological (and markets) base weakens the direct applicability of the technology life cycle model. Given these reservations, the case studies do add important insights to the phenomena of technological evolution.
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